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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
S. W. DOWSE,
Respondent,
vs.

FRED D. KAMMERM.AN and
VAUGHAN D. KAMMERM.AN,

Case No.

7719

doing business as KAMMERMAN COMPANY,

.Appellants.
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LAMAR DUNCAN,
.Attorney for Respondent.
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Point 1
The only question before this
Court is whether the vuit Claim
Deed of plaintiff in 1945 carried
the after acquired interest of
plaintiff,vhich he obtained in 1950
whereby he would be estopped from
setting up title which he obtained
later by the decree of distribution
as hereinabove set forth, in the
absence of any showing of fraud or
misrepresentation.· • .
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
S. W. DOWSE,

Respondent,
vs.
FRED D.

KAMMERMAN and

VAUGHAN D. KAMMERMAN,

Case No.
7719

doing business as KAMMERMAN COMPANY,

Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action in which plaintiff, hereinafter
called respondent, commenced an action in the District
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, against defendant, hereinafter called appellant, to quiet title to certain land
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and described as Lot 7, Block 1, Holland Subdivision.
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Defendants and appellants herein set up title based
upon a warranty deed which they had procured from
the Doris Trust Company. The Doris Trust Company
had in turn received the Quit Claim Deed from respondent who at the time of said conveyance held a tax deed
to the land from Salt Lake County. The title to the
premises was originally held by one Charles E. Pittorf,
who held the property from February 26, 1907. In
1930 the taxes were not paid and on December 22, 1930
the County Treasurer of Salt Lake County executed a
tax sale to Salt Lake County. The taxes for the years
1931 to 1934 inclusive were added and on March 31,
1936, an Auditor's Tax deed was issued to Salt Lake
County.
On April 24, 1945, Salt Lake County conveyed the
property to 8. W. Dowse, who with Pearl B. Dowse, his
wife, on the 13th day of June, 1945, conveyed to 'Doris
Trust Company, Doris Trust Company thereafter deeded
to appellants.
Thereafter on March 14, 1950 respondent Dowse
obtained quit claim deeds from the heirs of Charles E.
Pittorf who, it appears, had died July 12, 1912. Thereafter, the estate of Charles E. Pittorf was probated
and the estate distributed to respondent Dowse as the
assignee of the heirs of Charles E. Pittorf.
These facts were stipulated to by the parties at
the time of trial, and in addition it was stipulated that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the Auditor's affidavit was missing fro1n the tax assessment and the tax sale upon whieh the tax deed was
predicated was Yoid and defectiYe as heretofore decided
by this Honorable Court in the case of Telonis vs. Staley,
104: Utah 537, 14:4: P. 2nd 513, and Equitable Life and
Casualty Ys. Schoeu·e, 105 _Utah 569, 144: P. 526.

ir~

ARGUMENT

::::

.

Based upon this defective tax deed through which
defendants claim title the Court found the issues in
favor of plaintiff and against defendant, but ordered
plaintiff to reimburse defendants in the sum of $105.57,
the amount paid by defendants and predecessors in
interest, to wit, the Doris Trust Company. Plaintiff
thereupon paid said amount and was granted a decree
quieting title to the land mentioned in his complaint.

/

Respondent in answer to appellants' statement of
errors relied upon, is unable to separately answer the
three so-called statements of errors relied upon as set
forth by appellants, inasmuch as they all resolve themselves into one.
The only question before this Court is whether
the Quit Claim Deed of plaintiff in 1945 carried the
after acquired interest of plaintiff, which he obtained
in 1950, whereby he would be estopped from setting
up title which he obtained later by the decree of distribution as hereinabove set forth, in the absence of any
showing of fraud or misrepresentation.
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Appellants in their brief at page 5 quote from
19 Am. Jur. at page 601 that no estoppel arises from a
.Quit Claim Deed and state that appellants accept the
general statement of the law on the subject as quoted,
· but add that "special factual situation" as set forth
in the case at bar should apply to change this statement.
Then appellants cite a number of cases where equitable estoppel was applied to prevent a person from
recovering where he had not acted in good faith or
had been guilty of some kind of improper conduct.
Contrary to appellants' inferences, nothing appears
from the evidence or anywhere in the record of this
case wherein it would appear that plaintiff conducted
himself improperly in obtaining the decree of distribution. Further, there is no evidence that plaintiff in
1945 knew of the whereabouts of Pittorf or any of his
heirs, when he obtained the defective tax title from
Salt Lake County, and after two months sold it to Doris
. Trust Company, the grantor of Appellants herein. If
the plaintiff had had any such knowledge of the whereabouts of Charles E. Pittorf or any of his heirs in
1945 and that fact appeared anywhere in the record
or evidence, appellants might have a basis for their
contention that plaintiff did not act in good faith; but
nothing of that kind is shown.
19 American Juris, page 617, No. 19 :

"Effect of Quit-Claim. As a general rule, a
quit clai1n deed, not affirming, either ex~ressly
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or by implication, the existence of any estate or
interest in the grantor, does not estop him from
asserting an after acquired title or interest.
Since a Quit Claim Deed as such purports to
grant only the estate or interest, the addition
of a 'varranty against the grantor or those
claiming by, through or under him, will not
estop the grantor to assert a title subsequently
acquired, assuming that it is not derived through
any act or conveyance of his own prior to the
deed in question. On the other hand, if a quit
claim deed contains recitals or evidences an intention to convey a particular interest, it may
operate by way of estoppel."
In the recent case of Williams vs. Barney, 224 P.
2nd 10-12, decided by this Honorable Court November
29, 1950, it was held that it did not appear that defendant had relied upon any representation of plaintiff's predecessor in interest in the purchase of the tax
title and therefore the doctrine of estoppel would not
apply.
In U. 8. National Bank of LeGrande vs. Arthur
Ben Miller, 122 Ore. 285, 285 Pac. 205 (1927), 58 A.L.R.
339 at page 344:
"In order to estop a grantor from claiming
an after acquired title, the grant must contain
references or representations which he is compelled to repudiate in order to assert his after
acquired title."
Defendant in the instant case is not disputing any
recital or representations in his deed under which plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tiff' claims. That deed conveyed all the interest plaintiff
had in the premises described therein at the time it was
made. Defendant is not claiming anything contradicting
that deed.
This point 1s reviewed at length in 58 A.L.R. 360
(note) as follows:
"The general rule is well established that,
if a deed does not purport, by express terms or
by implication, to convey a particular estate, but
only the grantor's title or interest, in other words,
if the conveyance is merely by quit claim deed,
and there are no covenants or recitals showing
any intention to convey any definite interest or
estate, the grantor is not thereby estopped from
asserting an after acquired title or interest."
(See cases collected in 58 A.L.R. 360, et seq.)
Further, 58 A.L.R. 362 :
"Thus although an ordinary quit claim deed
will not estop the grantor from asserting an afteracquired interest, yet a distinct recital in such
a deed showing that the parties proceeded on the
theory that a particular interest was thereby
conveyed may be as effectual to create an estoppel as a warranty."
In 16 American Jurisprudence, page 637, Sec. No.
344, it is stated as follows :
"It is well established that a mere quit claim
deed, by which the grantor professes to convey
only such interest as existed in him at the time
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the execution of the instrument, without affirming, either expressly or by ilnplication the existence of any estate or interest in hilnself does not
ilnport that the grantor possesses any interest at
all and is ineffectual either by force of an estoppel or otherwise, to pass the grantee any title
or right acquired by the grantor subsequent to
the execution of such quit claim deed. In other
words, a quit claim does not so operate that a
title acquired by the grantor subsequently thereto will inure to the grantee. Moreover, if a deed
does not affirm or purport to convey any particular estate, a covenant of warranty will be
regarded as referring merely to the grantor's
existing interest and will not estop him from
asserting an after acquired title. It has been so
held even as to a quit claim in which the habendum
clause would have passed a fee if the grantor
had at the time possessed such an estate."
In Rowell vs. Rowell, Mont. (1946), 174 P. 2nd 223,
the Court held :
"A grantee is estopped to assert an after
acquired title only where such assertion would
involve the denial that the conveyance passed the
interest or estate which it purported to pass."
Again in Woodside vs. Bertha Durham, Mo., 295
S.W. 772 (1927), 535 A.L.R. 884:
"An equitable estoppel does not arise from
any act or conduct unless it is relied upon by
another who is thereby caused to change his
situation or to suffer detriment or losses."
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If the deed by Respondent to the Doris Trust Company expressly or impliedly indicated an intention to
pass any after acquired title which he might have obtained, then and in that event the position of appellant
would have merit. This does not appear from the evidence however, and we submit that the whole transaction was one in which the seller Doris Trust Company
received what it bargained for. Further, there is no
evidence to show that Respondent at the time of such
conveyance knew or had any knowledge concerning the
whereabouts of Pittorf, and that such information was
withheld from the purchaser, Doris Trust Company.
There is no showing of any fraud or deceit at any
time on the part of Respondent Dowse and by the simple
doctrine of caveal emptor appellant knew or should
have known what he was buying when he received the
quit claim deed from Respondent Dowse.

CONCLUSION
We therefore submit in conclusion that appellants
have wholly failed to show any evidence of fraud, misrepresentation or any reliance upon any statement or
conduct of respondent which induced Doris Trust Company, the predecessor in interest of plaintiff to make
such purchase from said respondent, whereby such conveyance would come within the rule of exceptions to
Quit Claim Deeds. Therefore and in the absence of
such showing and in view of the numerous decisions
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upon the subject, son1e of which are hereinabove mentioned, we respectfully urge that the judgment be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
LA~IAR

DUNCAN,

Attorney for Respondent.
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